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Abstract 
Examining travellers’ preferences for mode choices to understand a relationship between traveller and 
transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) from the perspective of agency theory (AT) is the main focus 
of this paper. This paper emphasises on latent and traditional objective attributes to assess the mode 
choice process within the agency relationship as indicated in AT as a method by which the utility of 
the principal (traveller) can be maximised. It is found that the probability of car use is significantly 
higher than public transport due to mismatch between traveller expectations and present transport ser-
vices and it indicates an existence of agency problem in this services. Finally, some arguments have 
been identified to minimise this problem. Thus, the contribution of this research is three-fold: firstly, 
the application of agency theory’s utility and implications in traveller choice behaviour; secondly, the 
demonstration of scale to which attributes influence traveller mode choice to shape the agency rela-
tionship within transport mode services; and finally, a pathway for the improvement of agency rela-
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1. Introduction 
This paper interprets traveller choice behaviour and transport services in a different perspective us-
ing agency theory (AT) which is a novel idea in transportation research. The additional insight of this 
perspective is developing models to understand the expectation of service users (i.e. principal) and 
how Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) can be effectively monitored by the service users too. 
Design of the model is aimed at identifying an optimal level of indirect monitoring by the traveller, 
which will maximise user utility to guide agent’s performance. Whether TfNSW performs effectively 
on the interest of travellers it can understand how it should achieve sustainable transport management. 
Thus, the finding of this study contributes to the AT debate, in essence that the TfNSW will improve 
the performance to avoid possible conflict of traveller interests and eventually to minimise the agency 
uncertainty.  
 
AT, also known as the principal-agent or principal agency theory/model describes the relationship 
between two or more parties, in which one party is designated as principal that assigns another party, 
called agent to perform some tasks on behalf of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Moe, 1984; 
Ross, 1973). AT assumes that agents have more information than principal (Grammenos and Papapos-
tolou, 2012) which is known as informational asymmetries that adversely affects the principal’s abil-
ity to monitor agent’s activities. Moreover, an assumption of AT is that principals and agents should 
act rationally and try to maximise their interests. Since principals do not have access to a decision that 
is made by an agent, they are unable to control or motivate whether the agent’s actions are in the best 
interest of the principal called adverse selection. 
 
Several researchers (such as Thompson and McKee, 2011; Zu and Kaynak, 2012; Rasmussen and 
Gulbrandsen, 2012; Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011; Zsidisin and Ellram, 2003; and Whipple and 
Roh (2010) have applied the knowledge of AT in their respective fields, but the application of this 
theory in transport service sector is still left aside. The application of AT in transport service research 
is not well understood by the previous researchers and therefore, this theory has not been used before. 
The current study, then, takes an attempt to fill in this gap. Rarely in transportation arena, AT investi-
gates the relationship between government and service operator (Hensher et al., 2007) but they ig-
nored the travellers’ preferences, which influence government’s decision making process significant-
ly, in their study.     
 
The role of TfNSW (agent) is to maximise the utility (i.e. traveller preferences) of the traveller 
(principal) within available resources. To understand the utility function of travellers in mode choice, 
TfNSW should have information about the nature of traveller’s desires and expectations. Thus, a met-
aphoric relationship is understood in between traveller and TfNSW as a principal and an agent as indi-
cated in AT. In view of this relationship, the need to maximisation of travellers’ utility within the lim-
ited budget is, therefore, important to examine travellers’ preferences for various attributes of the 
modal choice. Travellers may not trust the quality of services performed by the TfNSW, because of its 
tendency to focus on its internal goals as opposed to more direct measures of the principals’ goals.   
 
Focusing internal goals may be realised due to lack of better understanding of travel decision mak-
ing attributes such as latent and socioeconomic variables. Limited budget could also be another issue 
to characterise mistrust agent. Thus, this research contributes to this unaddressed understanding of 
travel choice behaviour in exploring the relationship between traveller and TfNSW.  
 
This paper is organised as follows. Section 1 introduces the subject matter of this paper with under-
standing a relationship between traveller and TMA. Section 2 gives a conceptual description of the re-
lationship and hypotheses involved. Section 3 provides the data sources and methods employed in this 
paper. In section 4, the empirical results have been stated and discussions on inferred relationship are 
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accommodated in section 5. Finally section 6 offers guidelines on the improvement of agency prob-
lem and conclusions. 
2. Agency and Traveller-TfNSW Relationship  
Due to the agency problem1, the concept of perfect and imperfect agent has become apparent. If the 
agent executes entrusted tasks perfectly to what the principal wants, it is called a perfect agent that is 
quite difficult to achieve in the real world and therefore, the concept of imperfect agent has emerged. 
However, Scott and Vick (1999) defines ‘perfect’ agent as follows:   
 
…one who makes the same decisions that the principal would have made if the principal 
possessed the same information and expertise as the agent. (p.113) 
 
According to this definition, TfNSW may not be a perfect agent since travellers do not possess the 
same and necessary information and knowledge as TfNSW, and also services (tasks) expected by 
travellers are not performed perfectly by TfNSW. Rather, it is more useful to understand the possible 
sources of imperfect agency with the effects of attributes on the decision made by travellers. The first 
of these is to what extent TfNSW acts in travellers’ best interests. Imperfect agency may arise if the 
TfNSW has an incorrect perception about the travellers’ utility function.       
 
There are two aspects to this misperception. The first is that travellers have more information than 
the TfNSW about the arguments in their utility function. The second is that only travellers possess in-
formation about the importance that they attach to these arguments. Imperfect agency arises where 
there is a difference between the perception of TfNSW about the travellers' utility function, and the 
importance attached to its arguments by travellers themselves.   
 
The second main source of imperfect agency is informational asymmetries between the traveller 
and TfNSW. TfNSW has more information and experience about the process of designing and im-
plementing a transport system and its effects on mobility.   
 
Hence, traveller choice is an important issue here. Choice of traveller describes preference which is 
connected to goal conflicts in AT. Choice is clearly seen as important in assessing the effectiveness of 
the agency relationship between traveller and TfNSW. 
 
Considering the above discussion, two hypotheses can be stated to understand the traveller- TfNSW 
relationship as below: 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1):  Where there is a high use of public transport, the TfNSW is performing the 
entrusted tasks as per travellers’ demand, which indicates an improvement in 
agency uncertainty; 
                                                     
1 The agency problem may arise when an agent pursues self-interested goals at the expense of the principal’s 
goals (Kivisto, 2008).  
Hypothesis 2 (H2):  Where there is a high use of private transport, it is likely that the TfNSW is 
acting largely in its own self-interest, and the agency problem remains 
unresolved. 
3. Data and Methods  
3.1 Data source 
The key data source of this research was cross-sectional 2010/11 household travel survey (HTS) 
data. This was the largest and most comprehensive household travel survey of Sydney conducted by 
the Bureau of Transport Statistics (BTS) of TfNSW. BTS conducted a household questionnaire sur-
vey. This survey includes Sydney, Newcastle and Illawarra areas and collected four types of data: 
household data, person data, trip data and linked trip data. For this particular study, only ‘Sydney’ and 
‘person data’ have been taken into consideration for data analysis. The HTS consisted of a face-to-
face interview survey carried out every day from July to June of the financial year 2010/11 that was 
released in 2012. This collection method ensured high data quality and maximised response rates too. 
Each respondent was requested to maintain a simple travel diary to record the details of all trips un-
dertaken for their nominated 24-hour period. An interviewer then interviewed each respondent to col-
lect the details of each trip. Detailed socio-demographic information was also collected through this 
survey.     
 
Descriptions of data used in this study  
Six latent variables (LV) and 13 traditional objective attributes (TOA) are evaluated to determine 
the impact on travellers’ mode choice to understand traveller-TfNSW relationship.  
 
LVs are: 
(i) Comfort,  
(ii) Convenience, 
(iii) Safety,  
(iv) Flexibility,  
(v) Reliability, and  
(vi) Satisfaction 
 
Thirteen TOAs are: 
(i) income (in Australian dollar), 
(ii) age (in years),  
(iii) gender (1 if male, 0 otherwise),  
(iv) having children (0-14 years),  
(v) car ownership,  
(vi) family size,  
(vii)    full time workers of household, 
(viii)    travel time (in minutes),  
(ix)    travel cost (in Australian dollar), 
(x)   waiting time (in minutes), 
(xi)   trip rate (trip per person per day), 
(xii)   trip purpose (1 if work, 0 otherwise), and  
(xiii)   distance travelled (in kilometre). 
 









Table 1. Description of LVs 
Latent factors Explained by (indicators) Definitions 
 
Comfort  
- Enjoy time to read/relax on vehicle Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Stressfulness on vehicle Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Service slower 
 
Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
 
Convenience  
- Mode availability  Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Accessibility (does not go where required) Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Timetable availability 
 
Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
 
Safety  
- Safety response  for mode used in 1st trip Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Safety response  for mode used in 2nd trip Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Safety response  for mode used in 3rd trip  
 




- Fixed start and finish times – each day can vary Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Rotating shift Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Roster shift Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Variable hours 
 
Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
 
Reliability  
- Frequency  Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Punctuality Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Faster 
 
Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
 
Satisfaction  
- Cleanliness  Importance with 1, otherwise 0 
- Travel time Travel time in minutes 
- Travel cost  Travel cost in Australian dollar  
- Waiting time Waiting time in minutes  
 
Reliability of all the indicators listed in Table 1 was tested using factor analytic models (explorato-
ry and confirmatory factor model) with the model fit criteria according to GFI, AGFI, NFI, CFI and 
RMSEA with lower and upper bound. The factor analytic model focuses solely on how, and the extent 
to which, the observed variables are linked to their underlying latent factors (Byrne, 2010). However, 
due to the space reason findings of factor analytic models are not presented in this paper. For further 
details about the findings of factor analytic models, please see Anwar, 2014.      
3.2 Methods2 
To achieve the objectives of this paper, it focuses on both LVs and TOAs during the mode choice 
process within the agency relationship. A traditional random parameter logit (TRPL) model is also 
compared with a hybrid RPL (HRPL) model in this paper. For the later model, a two-step approach 
(also known as sequential approach) is implemented to incorporate LVs in choice models. Step 1 is 
the estimation of a MIMIC (multiple indicators and multiple causes) model; a type of regression mod-
el with a latent dependent variable(s). Step 2 is the estimation of a choice model with random parame-
ters; information from the first step is incorporated in the second step. 
 
Modelling with latent variables 
A MIMIC model, that defines latent variable (LVs) appropriately, is estimated first, where the LVs 
(ijl) are explained by characteristics (sijr) from the users (individuals), alternatives (mode alternative) 
and trip nature through structural equation (Eq. 1); as the analysts cannot collect data on LV directly, 






                                                     
2 Authors have also used similar methods in other papers (Anwar et.al, 2014) 
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where, i to an individual,  j refers to an alternative, , l to a LVs, r to an explanatory variables belong 
to TOAs and p to an indicator; jlr and jlp are parameters to be estimated, while ijl and ijp are error 
terms with mean zero and standard deviation to be estimated.  
 
Specification of latent variable model 
Six LVs and 13 TOAs are considered in this study. The structural relationship in MIMIC model 
guides the specification for computation of LVs (Figure 1 illustrates the results of this process), which 
results in the following set of equations: 
 
Comfortij = inc-com,j*Incomei +  tco-com,j*Travel costi +  wti-com,j*waiting timei + car-com,j*Car owner-
shipi + dt-com,j*Distance travelledi + chi-com,j*Having childreni + com,ij 
 
Convenienceij = age-conv,j*Agei +  gen-conv,j*Genderi +  car-conv,j*Car ownershipi + wti-conv,j*Waiting timei + tti-
conv,j*Travel timei + chi-conv,j*Having childreni +inc-conv,j*Incomei +tp-conv,j*Trip purpopsei +tr-
conv,j*Trip ratei + dt-conv,j*Distance travelledi +  tco-conv,j*Travel costi + conv,ij  
 
Safetyij  = age-saf,j*Agei +  tr-saf,j*Trip ratei + car-saf,j*Car ownershipi + dt-saf,j*Distance travelledi + 
chi-saf,j*Having childreni + wti-saf,j*waiting timei +saf,ij 
 
Flexibilityij = gen-fle,j*Genderi +  chi-fle,j*Having childreni + car-fle,j*Car ownershipi +  
tp-fle,j*Trip purpopsei + tp-fle,j*Trip purpopsei + fle,ij 
 
Reliabilityij = tti-rel,j*Travel timei +  wti-rel,j*Waiting timei + ft-rel,j*Full time workersi +  
car-rel,j*Car ownershipi + dt-rel,j*Distance travelledi + rel,ij 
 
Satisfactionij = tti-sat,j*Travel timei +  tco-sat,j*Travel costi +  wti-sat,j*Waiting timei +  
car-sat,j*Car ownershipi + age-sat,j*Agei + sat,ij 
   
 
yy1,ij = y1,j * Comfortij + y1,ij yy11,ij = y11,j * Flexibilityij + y11,ij 
yy2,ij = y2,j * Comfortij + y2,ij yy12,ij = y12,j * Flexibilityij + y12,ij 
yy3,ij = y3,j * Comfortij + y3,iq yy13,ij = y13,j * Flexibilityij + y13,ij 
yy4,ij = y4,j * Convenienceij + y4,ij yy14,ij = y14,j * Reliabilityij + y14,ij 
yy5,ij = y5,j * Convenienceij + y5,ij yy15,ij = y15,j * Reliabilityij + y15,ij 
yy6,ij = y6,j * Convenienceij + y6,ij yy16,ij = y16,j * Reliabilityij + y16,ij 
yy7ij = y7,j * Safetyij + y7,ij yy17,ij = y17,j * Satisfactionij + y17,ij 
yy8,iq = y8,j * Safetyij + y8,ij yy18,ij = y18,j * Satisfactionij + y18,ij 
yy9,ij = y9,j * Safetyij + y9,ij yy19,ij = y19,j * Satisfactionij + y19,ij 




























































Hybrid discrete choice modelling 
By maximising the utility (Uij), individuals take a decision based on the assumption of random 
utility theory. It is also assumed that an analyst can only determine a representative portion (systemat-
ic component) of utility (Vij) function, therefore, an error term (ij) to each alternative (Ortúzar and 
Willumsen, 2001) is required to be included in the function as stochastic component. Mathematically 
the utility function becomes as below:  
  
 Uij = Vij + ij,        (3) 
where Vij is a function of objective attributes Xijk, i.e. travel time and cost, socio-economic and trip 
characteristics of the individual, etc. and k stands for all objective variables together).  
 
Eq. (4) is derived by including latent variables in the utility function, where jk and jl are parame-
ters to be estimated: 
 
 Vij = kjk * Xijk + ljl * ijl       (4) 
   Indicator - y1 
Indicator – y2 
Indicator – y3 
Indicator – y4 
Indicator – y5 
Indicator – y12 
Indicator – y6 
Indicator – y14 
Indicator – y9 
Indicator – y13 
Indicator – y7 
Indicator – y8 
Indicator – y10 
Indicator – y11 
Indicator – y15 
Indicator – y16 
Indicator – y17 
Indicator – y18 
Indicator – y19 
















Full time work 
Trip rate 
Trip purpose  
Distance travelled  
Figure 1 Process of structural and measurement relationship  
(Adapted from Anwar et al. 2014) 
Only the alternative j is chosen, if the utility of alternative, ‘j’, is greater than or equal to the utility 








As sequential approach is used in this study, discrete choice model is estimated with MIMIC mod-
el’s structure (Eq.1) and measurement (Eq.2) equations (Ben-Akiva et al., 2002).  
  
Specification of random parameter logit (RPL) model 
According to Eq. (3), the utility that individual i receives from alternative j is denoted by Uij, which 
is the sum of systematic component Vij and a stochastic component ij and in linear relationship.  
 
The systematic component of utility Vij can be rewritten as xijβj, where xij is a vector of explanatory 
variables that are observed by the analyst from any source related to individuals and alternatives. βj is 
a vector of parameters to be estimated. The stochastic component of utility ij   can also be rewritten as 
zijηi + eij, where zij is a vector of characteristics that can vary over individuals, alternatives, or both 
(there may have some or all common elements in both zij and xij), and eij is a random term with zero 
mean that is IID (independent and identically distributed) over individuals and alternatives and is 
normalised to set the scale of utility. The random variable ηi is a vector of random terms with zero 
mean that varies over individuals according to the distribution f(η |), where  are the fixed parame-
ters of the distribution f. Accordingly, the utility Uij that individual i gets from alternative j can be 
written as [xijβj + (zijηi + eij )]. In matrix form, it can be written as: 
 
U = Xβ + (Zη + e)      (6) 
 
If IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) exists, then η = 0 for all i and so utility U depends 
on only the systematic and IID stochastic portion of utility. Initially innovated logit models assume 
that IIA does not estimate Zη; thus η is assumed as zero. Because of that, unobserved taste variations 
have not been addressed in initially innovated logit models.  Hence, by incorporating the effect of Zη 
in utility function, discrete choice models can be able to accommodate those impacts and thus avoid 
the IIA assumption. These models estimate  (the parameters of the distribution of η) as well as β. 
 
To derive a RPL model from Eq. (6), e is assumed as IID extreme value, while η follows a general 
distribution, f( |). If η = 0, it is MNL which has the IIA property. Estimation of the RPL generally 
involves estimating β and . The choice probabilities depend on β and η and the probability to select 






As η is not given, by integrating over all values of η weighted by the density of η the unconditional 






                                                     
3 All t includes alternative j 
dij 
1 if Uij >= Uit, t  C 
0 other case 
























Models of this form are called random parameter logit (RPL). The probabilities do not exhibit the 
IIA property, and the specification of f describes different substitution patterns. The RPL model han-
dles it in two ways. One way is known as random parameter specification that specifies each i with 
both a mean and a standard deviation. The error component is another way to deal with the unob-
served taste variation as a separate error component in the random parameter that is by estimated with 
standard deviation as an additional error component which is an identical outcome. 
4. Empirical Results   
Due to space reason in this paper, only the results of α vector matrix in structural equation of 
MIMIC model are presented here (Table 2). The estimated coefficients were valid according to model 
fit criteria such as GFI, AGI, NFI, CFA and RMSEA with lower and upper bound that were calculated 
by AMOS v.19. The results obtained from MIMIC model have been used to quantify latent variables 
that are incorporated in discrete models (Table 3) as explanatory variables. The models were estimat-
ed with Nlogit v.4 econometric software, using maximum likelihood estimation procedures. 
 
Table 3 presents the results obtained from RPL models. The models discuss effects of choice at-
tributes both traditional and latent on transport mode. The TRPL model includes only the traditional 
attributes and HRPL model incorporates both latent and traditional attributes. 
























i.e          fLjjP (9) 































































































































































































Model fit criteria 
GFI 0.963 
AGFI  0.945 
NFI  0.901 





bound   
0.033 
0.013 (90% CI of RMSEA) 
0.048 (90% CI of RMSEA) 





Table 3. Results of random parameter logit models. 
Attributes RPL(t-values) HRPL(t-values)  
Random parameter in utility functions 
Travel cost (mean) 





Waiting time (mean)  











Car ownership (mean) 





Having children (mean) 





Trip purpose (mean) 



























 1.25 (3.00) 
0.10 (3.25) 
Nonrandom parameter in utility functions 
Travel time -1.20 (-4.10) -1.13 (-4.64) 
Gender  0.40 (1.89) -0.214 (2.01) 
Income  1.99 (2.11) 1.46 (1.99) 
Family size 0.90 (1.12) 0.89 (1.00) 
Full time workers of HH 0.94 (0.56) 0.93 (0.07) 
Trip rate 0.89 (2.55) 0.85 (2.70) 
Distance travelled  -0.81 (-2.22) -0.26 (-1.90) 
Mode constant 
Car as a passenger (base) 0 0 
Car as a driver  -2.09 (-3.00) -2.56 (-10.0) 
Train  -2.21 (-4.41 -2.41 (-4.15) 
Bus  -0.15 (-4.89) -0.103 (-3.11) 
Heterogeneity around the mean 
Travel cost :Income  -0.129 (-3.51) -0.011 (-4.11) 
Waiting time :Income  -0.48 (-5.01) -0.033 (-4.15) 
Age: Income  -0.07 (-0.98) -0.11 (-1.96) 
Car ownership: Income  0.011 (2.91) 0.61 (4.15) 
Having child: income  -0.1 (-3.16) -0.19 (-4.07) 
Purpose: Income 0.001 (3.01) 0.052 (3.11) 
Comfort: Income  0.101 (4.21) 
Convenience: Income  0.112 (3.80) 
Safety: Income  0.51 (10.51) 
Flexibility: Income  0.052 (1.80) 
Reliability: Income  0.35 (9.10) 
Satisfaction: Income  0.089 (4.11) 
Model statistics 
Log likelihood function  -696.80 -576.53 
McFadden Pseudo R-squared  0.28 0.38 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 0.0165 0.0136 
Modal choice probability 
Car as a driver 0.720 0.770 
Car as a passenger 0.049 0.020 
Train 0.204 0.211 
Bus 0.053 0.033 
 
 
HRPL model has the similar specification of model TRPL, but the effect 
of LV is allowed to vary among individuals; and also models introduce an 
interaction between the mean estimate of the random parameter and a co-
variate, which is equivalent to revealing the presence or absence of hetero-
geneity around the mean parameter estimate. In the TRPL models, all vari-
ables except age, family size, full time workers of household, and gender 
are significantly associated with the choice of travel mode. The HRPL 
model provides a better representation of the nature of preferences, as it 
accounts for variation in travellers’ preference heterogeneity across socio-
economic and other characteristics. 
 
In particular, the parameters of LVs are statistically significant in hybrid 
RPL model. Moreover, the high significance of the LVs standard deviation 
parameters in hybrid RPL model implies that the effects of the LVs over 
the choice process effectively and importantly vary across individuals. It is 
also noticed that the signs of the estimated parameters are coherent. With 
respect to mode-related and individual-specific attributes, the car owner-
ship per adult in household exhibit strong effects on travel mode choice 
(Bresson et al., 2004). As expected, owning car per adult in a household 
increases the propensity to use a car as a driver or train (park and ride) for 
daily trips to work. In contrast, none of the socioeconomic and trip varia-
bles age, family size, full time workers of household, and gender signifi-
cantly impacted mode choice.  
 
The estimated coefficients suggest that the most important attribute is 
“travel cost”, followed by “waiting time” “car ownership”, “having child”, 
and “travel time” according to TRPL models. The estimated coefficients 
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on the waiting time, travel cost and travel time variables have the expected 
negative signs since the utility of a mode decrease as the mode becomes 
high waiting time and/or slower and/or more expensive and are considered 
as disutility. The expected negative signs of these three variables, in turn, 
imply that this reduces the choice probability of the corresponding mode. 
Having child variable has negative sign that indicates the sensitivity over 
the choice. The positive sign of coefficient of car ownership indicates that 
respondents were more likely to choose (and prefer) car to make trip. From 
this it can be inferred that the lesser importance given by TfNSW on modal 
services generates lower utility on the services and therefore, people still 
desire to use their car. 
 
Having child also influences preferences for comfortable, safe and relia-
ble mode of transport.  While LVs are incorporated in the model, signifi-
cance level of objective variables has been decreased and it implies that 
travellers are more motivated by their latent preferences during the mode 
choice process. Thus, TfNSW is obliged to promote the modal services as 
per as travellers’ expectations.    
 
By incorporating the LVs in the hybrid RPL model, the results have 
been turned into more rational. Effects ofLVs show that travellers prefer 
“safer” and more “reliable” mode of transport to less safer and less reliable 
modal service. The coefficients of these two variable are high that indicate 
its dominant influence over the mode choice process. Importance of a con-
venient and comfortable mode of transport is also adequately observed. 
These are all as expected, confirming the theoretical validity. However, the 
introduction of HRPL allows us not only to improve model fit, but also to 
achieve better estimates of the parameters. 
 As per model statistics, the values of McFadden Pseudo R-squared are 
inflated from TRPL to HRPL which indicates that HRPL model is better. 
The lowest AIC values also signify the best model and thus HRPL models 
are better than TRPL models in this case. 
5. An Inferential Relationship: Perspective of Agency and 
Transport Mode Services    
In general, travellers take either public transport (e.g. train, bus) or pri-
vate transport (e.g. car) that maximises their level of satisfaction or ‘utili-
ty’. TfNSW provides public transport and travellers own their private cars. 
Travellers expect reliable, safe and comfortable public transport, and en-
trust this task to TfNSW to perform. TfNSW applies its experiences and 
skills to execute this task as per travellers’ expectations. A higher probabil-
ity of public transport usage would indicate better performance by TfNSW. 
It would imply that the travellers are getting their desirable mode of 
transport, similar to what they get from their own car, which is an indica-
tion of low agency problem in transport mode services. In contrast, a high 
probability of car usage would indicate the presence of high level of agen-
cy problem.     
 
In terms of the adverse selection in AT, travellers are not in a position to 
be aware, at a reasonable level, about the implementing phase of mode 
service project undertaken by TfNSW, and do not have the access to moni-
tor it. Thus, TfNSW may be influenced by other related stakeholders such 
as political, civil servants, transport companies and traveller’s access is 
limited to TfNSW’s project finalising stage (Anwar, 2014). Therefore, 
goal/choice conflicts/adverse selection may occur. 
 
Generally, choice processes of travellers are dominated by TOAs, such 
as travel time, travel cost, income. According to analysis in section 4, LVs 
contribute significantly to the determination of utility. The effects of 
choice attributes and the probability of using a particular mode are crucial 
aspects of understanding the principal-agent relationship in mode of 
transport service. LVs (e.g. comfort, convenience, safety, reliability) dom-
inate the choice process considerably in addition to TOAs. TfNSW is not 
fully aware about the traveller utility function and tends to ignore the LVs, 
which cause goal/choice conflicts and adverse selection. 
 
In terms of mode choice probability, the decreasing rate of probability 
for the mode “car as a passenger” (Table 3) indicates that the travellers are 
not comfortable with being a passenger on a car once the travellers consid-
er the latent and other relevant attributes. The probability of car usage as a 
driver is notably high which means that travellers (principal) are not pro-
vided with the services they desire and have entrusted to TfNSW for exe-
cution. Basically, TfNSW struggles to reduce the transport problems of cit-
ies such as ‘unreliable’ ‘no direct route’ and ‘congestion’ that travellers 
expect. However, since TfNSW is not reasonably able to perform accord-
ing to travellers’ expectations, travellers continue to use the private car. It 
indicates an agency problem in transport mode services. 
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6. Conclusions: Solutions to Agency Problem    
The efficient and customer–focused performance may occur if TfNSW 
offers a higher expected utility for public transportation service to car use. 
Travellers may stop using public transport if TfNSW is less responsive to 
customers’ dissatisfaction. It is assumed that TfNSW does not worsen the 
conditions for private transport users, the switching of travellers to public 
transport can occur only by increasing the expected utility of using public 
transportation services without reducing expected utility for private car.  
 
According to the findings of this paper, it was found that the probability 
of traveller transport mode choice is dominantly higher for private car use 
than public transport, which suggests that an agency problem exists in 
transport mode service. To reduce the agency problem, TfNSW should in-
tegrate traveller preferences, which are identified in this research as prom-
inent critical aspects, in planning and implementing stages of transport 
mode related projects. The results are also very useful for policy makers in 
shaping effective policies. 
 
As it was found that LVs are mostly dominant in traveller mode choice 
process, it should be adequately reflected in the current policy responses. 
Since the probability of using a private car is dominantly high, it indicates 
that public transport is not efficiently successful to attract travellers. In this 
case TfNSW should incorporate the traveller latent choice preferences in 
mode service and public transport use may be increased. Importantly, the 
strength of this paper is the clarification of the nature of traveller prefer-
ence heterogeneity, both observed and unobserved, in the process of mode 
choice as a principal-agent relationship in transport mode services. It can 
assist the transport planners or departments such as TfNSW to formulate 
effective and worthwhile policies to improve the transport system and to 
rectify the agency problem in the services finally.  
 
TfNSW’s goal is to improve traveller’s welfare and thus high frequency 
usage of public transportation should be targeted. By looking at the results 
describe in Table 3, priorities for managerial actions are highlighted be-
low. Base of the estimated coefficients of relevant parameters, the follow-
ings quality areas are critical for the agent (TfNSW) to make improve-
ments of the situation:  
 
        Among LVs        Among TOAs  
 Safety; 
 Reliability; 
 Travel cost; 
 Travel time; 
 Comfort; and 
 Convenience.  
 Waiting time; and 
 Car ownership. 
 
The analysis described in section 4 indicates that these traveller choice 
attributes are found important and TfNSW has not satisfactorily succeeded 
in meeting these needs since the percentage of public transport use is re-
markably low. TfNSW should attempt to increase its ability to meet these 
needs that helps to improve the agency problem in transport mode ser-
vices. 
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